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INCORPORATION OF PRO ATHLETES: SKATING ON
THIN ICE?
I. INTRODUCTION

A fashionable practice among many professionals, including
entertainers and athletes, is to create personal service corporations' in order
to obtain various tax and pension related benefits.2 The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) has often attacked the validity of these personal service
corporations, contending that income should be treated as earned by the
individual-shareholders, not the corporation.3 Over the years, the IRS attacked the validity of personal service corporations on various grounds
including the sham corporation doctrine, 4 the assignment of income doctrine,5 and the constructive receipt doctrine.6 The IRS has had mixed
success with these now established doctrines.7
In 1989, the IRS undertook a special litigation project to take on
several members of the Minnesota North Stars hockey team, who had
incorporated themselves in order to obtain various tax and pension related
benefits.'
The lead case, Sargent v. Commissioner,9 involved Gary
Sargent, a professional hockey player and taxpayer residing in Burnsville,
1. The Internal Revenue Code provides a specific definition of personal service corporations
depending on the issue in question. Section 269A defines a personal service corporation as "a
corporation the principal activity of which is the performance of personal services and such
services are substantially performed by the employee-owners." 26 U.S.C. § 269A(b)(1) (1993).
Compare 26 U.S.C. § 444(f) (1993) (personal service corporations defined for purposes of
choosing tax year end) with 26 U.S.C. § 448(d)(2) (1993) (personal service corporations defined
for purposes of cash basis accounting method).
2. Even after 1986 tax reforms, many professionals still prefer to operate as corporations in
order to take advantage of more favorable terms for deducting business expenses, net operating
loss, or medical expenses. See CCH TAX TRANSACrIONS LBRARY, THE FILMED ENTERTANMENT

INDUSTRY § 1002 (1993). Generally, prior to 1986, corporations were subject to a lower tax rate
than individuals. Prior to 1979, corporations had more flexibility in establishing qualified pension
plans such as defined benefit plans. See Frank V. Battle, Jr., The Use of Corporationsby Persons
Who Perform Services to Gain Tax Advantages, 57 TAXEs 797 (1979).
3. When the IRS reallocated income from the corporation to the individual-shareholder, the
result was a hefty assessment, since the individuals were usually taxed at higher brackets than
corporations. Battle, supra note 2, at 802.
4. Id
5. Id. at 803.
6. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
7. Battle, supra note 2, at 802.
8. Sargent v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 572, 573 (1989), rev'd, 929 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1991).
9. lId at 573.
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Minnesota. Sargent formed a wholly owned corporation, Chiefy-Cat, I°
with which he contracted to establish himself as president and sole direc2
tor." The contract specified terms of employment and compensation.'
Subsequently, Sargent caused Chiefy-Cat to enter into a contract with the
Minnesota North Stars. 3 This contract specified that Chiefy-Cat would
provide the services of Sargent to the North Stars in return for compensation. 4

The IRS argued that, despite these arrangements, Sargent was really
an employee of the North Stars rather than Chiefy-Cat, 15 and therefore,
any compensation paid by the North Stars to Chiefy-Cat was taxable
income to Sargent. 6 Based on this view, the IRS assessed a deficiency
of $79,384, resulting from allocating as income to Sargent amounts paid to
Chiefy-Cat. 7 The IRS based this contention on treasury regulations governing the status of employees as opposed to independent contractors for
purposes of withholding of payroll taxes ("withholding regulations").' 8
The majority of the United States Tax Court agreed with the IRS and held
that Sargent was indeed an employee of the North Stars and not of ChiefyCat.'9 The tax court agreed with the IRS' assessment of $79,384 and
ordered Sargent to pay it.2" Sargent appealed.2 '
10. Id at 574.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 93 T.C. at 574.
14. Id
15. Id
16. In other words, the IRS' position is that Sargent by providing his service to the North
Stars was really an employee of the North Stars, and, therefore, Sargent could not by virtue of
his contractual maneuvering allocate income paid for his services to Chiefy-Cat. 93 T.C. at 578.
17. The deficiency was the result of requiring Sargent to pay taxes at the rates applicable to
individuals on funds paid by the North Stars to Sargent's corporation, Chiefy-Cat, and not paid
out from Chiefy-Cat to Sargent as compensation. Interest and penalties are also included in the
IRS' computation. 93 T.C. at 573.
18. According to the treasury regulations, individuals who work as "employees" for an
employer are subject to withholding of income taxes. That is, if an employer hires an individual
to do work, and if that individual is classified as an "employee" according to factors specified in
the regulations, then the employer must withhold social security, federal income taxes, and state
income taxes from the employee's pay. On the other hand, if an employer hires an individual to
work as an "independent contractor" (for example, hiring a lawyer to file a specific claim) then
the employer need not withhold income taxes. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-l(c)(2) (1980).
19. 93 T.C. at 583.
20. Id at 573, 583.
21. Sargent v. Commissioner, 929 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1991).
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Characterizing the issue as "one of first impression," the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.0 The court of appeals held that the
tax court's adoption of the withholding regulations as the new standard was
an unwarranted deviation from the established approaches for analyzing the
The court of appeals then
validity of personal service corporations.3
applied tax court precedents to the facts and concluded that Sargent was
indeed an employee of Chiefy-Cat rather than the North Stars, 24 and that
amounts paid by the North Stars to Chiefy-Cat were not taxable directly to
Sargent.'
But the puck did not stop there. Shortly after the court of appeals
reversed, the IRS issued an angry Action on Decision26 criticizing the
court of appeals for rejecting its new arguments. 27 The IRS promised to
raise the issue again in all other circuits. 28
Is the IRS skating on thin ice? This Note will examine the
arguments that the IRS has traditionally used to attack personal service
corporations in the context of "incorporated talent" cases. This Note will
then compare the analysis applied by the tax court in Sargent with the
analysis applied by the court of appeals. Finally, this Note will examine
the weight of the arguments in favor of adopting the IRS' new approach
and will conclude with recommendations for practitioners who wish to
advise their clients regarding incorporating their talents. 2 '

22. Id. at 1253.
23. Id. at 1256.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1258.
26. An Action on Decision is a statement by the IRS in which the Service describes whether
it intends to conduct further litigation respecting the same issues. See Sargent v. Commissioner,
929 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1991), action on decision, 1991-022 (Oct. 22, 1991).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Burton W. Kanter & Sheldon I. Banoff, Incorporationof Pro Athletes-Is IRS a Bad
Sport?, 77 J. TAX'N 254 (1992).
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II. ATrACKING PERSONAL SERVICE CORPORATIONS
A. The TraditionalApproaches
IRS attacks on personal service corporations have traditionally been
based on "form-over-substance" type grounds.3 0 This section discusses the
3
most important of these grounds. '
1. Sham Corporations
The most "drastic" approach to personal service corporations is to
disregard the corporate -entity as a sham,32 on the theory that its only
purpose is tax avoidance, and attribute taxable income directly to the
shareholder-employee. 33 The Supreme Court in Moline Properties v.
Commissioner' addressed the issue of disregarding a corporation under
the sham corporation test. There, the Court held that a corporation constitutes an entity for tax purposes if it was organized for a legitimate business
purpose or if it engaged3 in substantial business activities, regardless of the
motive for its creation:
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in
business life. Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage
under the law of the state of incorporation or to avoid or to
comply with the demands of creditors or to serve the creator's
personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as that purpose
is the equivalent of [a] business activity or is followed by the
carrying on of business by the corporation,
the corporation
36
entity.
taxable
separate
a
remains
In Sargent, Chiefy-Cat was organized for the purpose of permitting
Sargent to take advantage of the lower tax rates available to corporations
and to permit Sargent to set up a corporate pension plan. 37 Chiefy-Cat
30. BORIS I. BrrKER & JAMES S. EuSTicE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS § 2.07 (5th ed. 1987).
31. Id. at 2-22.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

L
Id.
319 U.S. 436 (1943).
Id at 438-39.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Sargent v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 572, 574 (1989).
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was also set up for negotiations and dealings with the North Stars3" and
perhaps future negotiations with other clubs. 9 The IRS conceded that
these were sufficient business objectives to prevent application of the sham
corporation doctrine.'
2. Agent or Alter Ego
In some cases, the IRS has successfully argued that the personal
service corporation is a mere "agent" of the individual shareholder who is
the true owner of income, and therefore, income paid to the agentcorporation is really income that is taxable to the individual-shareholder. 4
This argument is based on the principle that a corporation, like an individual, may act as an agent or nominee for another person without becoming
taxable on income collected by it on behalf of its principal. 2 Thus, if a
corporation is a mere agent or an alter ego for its shareholder, serving no
other functions and engaging in no significant business activity, its separate
taxable identity may be disregarded.43 The IRS succeeded with this
44
argument in several important cases.
In Sargent,the IRS did not contend that Chiefy-Cat was a mere agent
of Sargent. The IRS was probably impressed by the fact that Chiefy-Cat
operated in its own name and that its actions did not directly bind
4
Sargent.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 578.
41. See generally BrTrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 30, § 2.10.
42. 1l
43. Id.
44. Factor v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 100, 130 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933
(1961) (shareholder taxed on income of his corporation under agency theory); Johansson v. United
States, 336 F.2d 809, 814 (5th Cir. 1964) (corporate income taxed directly to shareholder who
earned it); see generally BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 30, § 2.10.
45. Sargent v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 572, 578 (1989); see generally Bnh1cR & EUSTnCE,
supra note 30, § 2.10.
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3. Actual Earner
A fundamental principle in tax law is that "income must be taxed to
'6 In the context of personal service corporations,
him who earned it.
this
4
principle has given rise to the so-called "actual earner" test.' Under the
"actual earner" test, the issue is whether the shareholder-employee is the
"actual earner" of income so that income paid to the corporation by a third
party should be treated as income that is taxable directly to the individu48
al.
In Sargent,the "actual earner" of the compensation paid by the North
Stars was, in the view of the tax court, Sargent himself.4 9 According to
the tax court, Sargent was the "actual earner" because it was Sargent who
actually played for the North Stars."0 It was Sargent who attended the
practice sessions. 5' It was Sargent who had to abide by the orders of the
coaches and the management of the North Stars.52
Yet, one can argue that the "actual earner" in Sargent was really
Chiefy-Cat, since it was Chiefy-Cat who was "working" for the North Stars
using Sargent as its employee.53 After all, it was Chiefy-Cat that owned
the contracts pursuant to which the North Stars were receiving the services
46. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733,739-40 (1949). This principle was established
by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). There, Mr.
Earl, a corporate officer and a practicing attorney, entered into an agreement with his spouse
under which the parties agreed that all future fees earned by Mr. Earl were joint property of both
spouses. Mr. Earl argued that only one-half of his salary and fees was taxable to him because
the other half belonged to his spouse by virtue of their agreemenL Thus, the issue presented to
the Court was whether a taxpayer who anticipates earned income may assign part or all of that
earned income to another taxpayer by the use of a contract. The Court held that the taxpayer
could not assign this income. The Court reasoned that Congress intended to tax income to "the
man who earned it." Justice Holmes stated:
There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them
and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and
contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting
even for a second in the man who earned it. That seems to us the import of the
statute before us and we think that no distinction can be taken according to the
motives leading to that arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a
different tree from that on which they grew.
Id. at 114-15.
47. Johnson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 882, 891 (1982).
48. Id.
49. Sargent v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 572, 581, 583 (1989).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Sargent v. Commissioner, 929 F.2d 1252, 1259 (8th Cir. 1991).
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of Sargent.' The court of appeals appeared to argue this construction
when it said that the "actual earner" of income cannot be determined "by
merely pointing to the one actually turning the spade or dribbling the
ball."55
4. The Control Test
The ultimate question under the "actual earner" test is who earned
the income? 6 In the choice between an individual and a corporation, the
answer is difficult.57 The corporation is more than a passive donee of
income and often plays a substantial role in the earning process by
providing capital and resources.58 Thus, the true earner of corporate
income cannot be determined by merely pointing to the one actually doing
the work or "dribbling the ball."5 9 After noting these problems with the
"actual earner" test, the United States Tax Court, in Johnson v. Commissioner,' formulated what is now referred to as the "control test.""'
Under the "control test," the issue is whether the corporation or its
shareholder was the one "in control" of earned income.62 The "control
test" has two elements. First, the person who performed the work must be
"an employee of the corporation whom the corporation has the right to
direct or control in some meaningful sense."'63 Second, "a contract or
similar indicia recognizing the corporation's controlling position" must exist
between the corporation and the third party benefiting from the work of the
employee.'
Under the first element of the "control test," the issue is whether a
valid employer-employee relationship exists between the individualshareholder and the personal service corporation.65 In determining
whether the required employer-employee relationship exists, the court
considers whether a valid employment contract exists between the
54. Id at 1255.
55. Id. at 1259.
56. Johnson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 882, 891 (1982).
57. Id
58. BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 30, § 2.07.
59. Id
60. Johnson, 78 T.C. 882, 891 (1982).
61. Id
62. Id
63. I11
64. IM
65. Johnson, 78 T.C. at 891.
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individual-shareholder and the corporation." In Sargent, the relationship
of Chiefy-Cat and Sargent was governed by an employment contract.67
Although the purpose of the contract was to establish Sargent as an
employee of Chiefy-Cat, the tax court did not find this contract dispositive
in its decision as to whether Sargent was an employee of Chiefy-Cat. 6
On the other hand, the court of appeals found that this employment contract
was sufficient to prove that Sargent was an employee of Chiefy-Cat, thus
satisfying the first element of the "control test." 69
Under the second element of the "control test," the issue is whether
a contract or similar indicia recognizing the corporation's controlling
position exists between the personal service corporation and third parties
benefiting from the services of the shareholder-employee.7" In Sargent,
the tax court's view was that the contract between Chiefy-Cat and the North
Stars was not sufficient to show that the North Stars recognized ChiefyCat's position as the employer of Sargent.7' The court of appeals, on the
other hand, found that the contract was sufficient to show that the North
Stars viewed Chiefy-Cat as the employer of Sargent and the entity in control. 2 The court of appeals reasoned that the North Stars' reliance on
Chiefy-Cat as a separate entity from Sargent distinguished the case from
Johnson.73 In Johnson, the San Francisco Warriors refused to contract
66. Sargent v. Commissioner, 929 F.2d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir. 1991).
67. Id. at 1255.

68. Sargent v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 572, 580 (1989).
69. 929 F.2d at 1258. An example of how the "control test" is applied by the tax court is
provided by the case of Pflug v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. 685 (1989). There, JoAnn Pflug, a
professional actress, entered into an exclusive employment contract with her husband's corpora-

tion, Charwool Productions. IM.at 686. Subsequently, Charwool entered into a contract with 20th
Century Fox Studios, wherein Charwool agreed to provide the services of JoAnn Pflug for the
"Fall Guy" television series. I& The issue in the case was whether JoAnn Pflug was an employee of Charwool as opposed to an employee of 20th Century Fox. Id at 687. The tax court found
the contracts between the respective parties to be dispositive and stated that "[tihe fundamental

question is whether Charwool had the right to exercise dominion and control over the activities
of [Pflug]." On the facts, the court there found that Charwool had the requisite right to control
Pflug. Id. at 688.
70. Johnson, 78 T.C. at 891.
71. 93 T.C. at 583.
72. 929 F.2d at 1258.
73. Id. In Johnson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 882 (1982), the facts involved Charles Johnson,

a professional basketball player residing in Oakland, California. Id. at 883. Charles Johnson
began playing in the National Basketball Association ("NBA") in the fall of 1972. In September
of 1972, he signed an NBA Uniform Player contract with the San Francisco Warriors. The

contract obligated him to play basketball for the Warriors for one year. Id Johnson then signed
new contracts with the Warriors each year. Johnson's attorney attempted to have the Warriors
contract with Johnson's corporation rather than Johnson himself. However, the Warriors were
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with Charles Johnson's corporation.'

personally sign the contract."

The Warriors insisted that Johnson

In Sargent, however, the North Stars

viewed Chiefy-Cat as an acceptable entity with whom the North Stars were
able to contract for Gary Sargent's services." The court of appeals called
this type of reasoning the "contracts theory.""'
The "contracts theory" stands for the principle that, in determining
the person in "control," the court should look at the contracts between the
personal service corporation and third parties. In its Action on Decision,
the IRS called this "contract theory" a "form-over-substance" approach."

In the IRS' view, determining who is in control is a question of hard facts,
not a question of contracts.7 9 Here, the IRS would argue that the one in
control was none other than Sargent."0
5. Constructive Receipt
A related line of cases deals with the doctrine of constructive
receipt.8" Under the doctrine of constructive receipt, a taxpayer is required
to recognize income from the sale of personal services in the taxable year
adamant about having the NBA Uniform Player contract signed by the players, and thus, the
Warriors rejected the proposed licensing contract between the Warriors and Johnson's personal
service corporation. Id.at 884.
In applying the "control test," the tax court held that the income paid by the Warriors is
taxable income to Johnson and not to Johnson's personal service corporation. 78 T.C. at 893.
The tax court reasoned that Johnson's corporation did not meet the requirements of the "control
test." Id. The first element of the "control test" is that the employee must be controlled by his
personal service corporation. Id. at 891. The tax court found that this test is met by virtue of the
contract between Johnson and his corporation. Id. at 893. The second element of the "control
test" is that the corporation, not the employee, must be in control of the relationship between the
corporation and the third party. Id. at 891. The tax court found that this second element was not
met, since the Warriors had expressly refused to contract with Johnson's corporation and purposely contracted with Johnson himself. 78 T.C. at 893. Therefore, the court concluded that
Johnson's corporation was not the entity in control of the income paid by the Warriors. Id.
74. Johnson, 78 T.C. at 893.
75. Id.
76. 929 F.2d at 1258.
77. ld
78. Sargent v. Commissioner, 929 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1991), action on decision, 1991-022
(Oct. 22, 1991).
79. Id
80. 93 T.C. at 583.
81. See generally BoRis I. BrrrKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS § 36.2
(1988).
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in which he actually or constructively received payment for such ser83
vices. 2 The doctrine is best explained in the Treasury Regulations:
Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession is constructively received by him in the taxable year
during which it is credited to his account, set apart for him, or
otherwise made available so that he may draw upon it at any
time, or so that he could have drawn upon it during the
taxable year if notice of intention to withdraw had been given.
However, income is not constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations
or restrictions.84
Thus, under the constructive receipt test, the issue is whether income
earned by the corporation is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions
so that it is not income that should be taxed directly to the corporation's
controlling shareholder.8" In determining if the receipt of income is
subject to substantial limitations or restrictions, the court considers several
factors such as: (1) whether the funds were available to the shareholder so
that he could draw upon them at his will; (2) whether the corporation was
ready and able to pay him; (3) whether the right of the shareholder to
receive the income was not restricted by contract or other methods; and (4)
whether the failure to receive income resulted from the shareholder's own
choice. 6
Applying the constructive receipt doctrine to the facts of Sargent
tends to show that funds paid to Chiefy-Cat were not constructively received by Sargent. The relationship between Chiefy-Cat and Sargent was
not a casual relationship but was governed by contract." According to the
terms of the contract, Sargent received a certain amount of compensation
for his services, no more and no less." Chiefy-Cat did not maintain
substantial amounts of cash on its books so that Sargent could draw upon
corporate cash at his pleasure.8 9 The corporation appears to have carefully
82. 26 U.S.C. § 451(a) (1993) (generally requires taxpayers to report income in the "taxable
year in which received by the taxpayer"); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1979) (requires
the taxpayer to report income in the year in which the income is "constructively received").
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1979).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
87. Sargent v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 572, 574 (1989).
88. ML

89. Id.

19941

INCORPORATION OF PRO ATHLETES

managed its cash.9' The cash that came in from the North Stars was paid
either to Sargent as salary or as legitimate corporate expenses such as
payroll taxes and contributions to the pension plan.9'
6. Allocation of Income
Even if the personal service corporation's status as a separate taxable
entity is honored and the assignment of income doctrine is inapplicable, the
IRS may be able to reallocate part of the corporation's income to its
controlling shareholder-employee under section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code.' This provision permits gross income (as well as deductions and
credits) to be reallocated between or among two or more related organizations, if it is necessary to prevent evasion of taxes or to reflect clearly the
income of any such organizations.9 3
Thus, under the reallocation of income approach, the issue is whether
part of the corporation's income should be reallocated to its shareholder in
order to prevent the evasion of taxes or to clearly reflect the income of the
shareholder.9 4 In applying section 482, the court must determine whether
the arrangement between the personal service corporation and its controlling
shareholder-employee is comparable to an arm's length transaction between
two independent parties.9" This standard is satisfied if the shareholderemployee's compensation reasonably reflects the value of his services.96
In Sargent, Chiefy-Cat's income from the North Stars was $450,000
over the four years in question.
Chiefy-Cat paid Sargent a salary of
$345,000 and made contributions of $100,416 to its pension plan.98 The

90. L

91. Id
92. 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1993) provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits,
or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such
organizations, trades, or businesses.
93. Id.
94. d.
95. BrrrKER & EusTIcE, supra note 30, § 2.07.
96. See Hagg v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 604 (1987).
97. Sargent v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 572, 574 (1989).
98. Id at 575.
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entire compensation package to Sargent totaled $445,416, or ninety-nine
percent of the corporation's gross income.
Therefore, section 482
reallocation provisions could not be applied to the benefit of the IRS. 99
B. The Employer-Employee Tests
Thus far, this Note has reviewed some of the important established
doctrines for attacking personal service corporations. This Note will now
review the grounds that were raised by the IRS and adopted by the tax
court in Sargent v. Commissioner.
1. The Withholding Regulations
A significant body of law deals with whether a person working for
a corporate employer is an employee of that corporation, subject to income
tax withholding, or a mere independent contractor, not subject to withholding." This important issue is governed by section 3121 of the Internal
Revenue Code and related treasury regulations ("withholding regulations").'"' Under the withholding regulations, the issue is whether the
corporation exercised sufficient control over its shareholder-employee so
that the shareholder may be considered a true employee of the corporation." In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the court considers several factors among which are: (1) whether the
corporation has the right to control the details and means by which the
work is accomplished;' °3 (2) whether the corporation provides the instrumentalities and the facilities;104 (3) whether the worker is classified as an
employee under local workers' compensation and unemployment6 tax
laws; 05 and (4) whether the relationship is long-term or short-term."
99. Id. at 587 n.2 (dissenting opinion comment about section 482 allocation).
100. See 26 U.S.C. § 3121 (1993); Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2) (1980).
101. 26 U.S.C. § 3121 (1993) (provides one definition of an "employee" as, among others,
"any individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employeremployee relationship, has the status of an employee").
102. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-l(c)(2) (1980).
103. Id
104. Id.
105. See Professional & Executive Leasing, Inc. v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.
1988).
106. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2) (1980).
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The first factor is the right of the corporation to control the details
and means by which the work is performed. 7 This factor focuses on the
extent to which the employer has discretion to decide on when and how
long the worker must work and the specific means by which the worker
will do his work.0 In this regard, it is not necessary that the employer
actually direct or control the manner and means of the work, only that the
employer has the right to do so.1°9 The extent of control necessary for
a professional to qualify as an employee is less than that necessary for a
nonprofessional." 0
In Sargent, the tax court found that applying this first factor clearly
indicates that Sargent was in fact an employee of the North Stars rather
than an employee of Chiefy-Cat."' The tax court noted that Sargent was
under the direct control and supervision of the coaches and managers of the
North Stars."' Sargent was required to comply with club rules;" 3 he
went to practice when he was ordered to do so," 4 and he played when the
5
coaches decided that he should play."
Nonetheless, Sargent argued that his status was not that of a lowly
employee but that of a highly skilled professional'1 6 and that he had substantial discretion to play according to his skill and experience."17 The
tax court was not impressed by this argument." 8 The tax court reasoned
that Sargent, skilled as he was, was still part of a team of equally skilled
persons." 9 Sargent could not use his skills except in the context of
instructions provided by his coach.' 0 The court of appeals, on the other
hand, was more sympathetic to Sargent's argument,2 2 reasoning that
Sargent enjoyed a status similar to that of a hired professional.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
862 F.2d at 753.
Sargent v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 572, 583 (1989).
Id at 579, 580.

Id.
Id.

Id.
93 T.C. at 579, 580.

Id.
Id
Id

Id.
Sargent v. Commissioner, 929 F.2d 1252, 1256 (8th Cir. 1991).
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The second factor is whether the corporation provides the instrumentalities and facilities."z In Sargent, the tax court noted that the North
Stars provided the uniforms, the equipment, and the facilities."
This
factor tends to indicate that Sargent was an employee of the North
Stars. 24 The court of appeals did not address this factor.
The third factor is whether the worker is classified as an employee
for purposes of workers' compensation and local payroll tax laws." In
Sargent, the tax court did not address this factor. However, in the
statement of facts, the tax court noted that, for purposes of the National
Hockey League's pension plan, Sargent was not classified as an employee
of the North Stars. 12 6 Neither the tax court nor the court of appeals
appears to have given this fact any weight.
The fourth factor is whether the relationship between the corporation
and the worker is a long-term or short-term relationship.' 27 Thus, the
court can consider whether the employer has the right to discharge the
worker after a certain task is completed or whether the corporation has the
right to assign additional work to the worker after the task at hand is
completed.'2 In Sargent, Chiefy-Cat's contract with the North Stars had
a duration of one year, 2 9 renewable each year at the option of the
parties. 30 Both the tax court and the appeals court ignored this factor.
2. The 'Team Sports" Test
In an important article'
addressing the issue of classifying
employees and independent contractors, Professor Sheldon I. Banoff suggested that, rather than attempt an ad hoc balancing in every case, the
courts should follow an "overall principle" that would increase predictabili122. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-l(c)(2) (1980).
123. 93 T.C at 577.
124. Id.
125. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-l(c)(2) (1980).
126. 93 T.C. at 576.
127. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-l(c)(2) (1980).
128. Id.
129. 93 T.C. at 574.
130. Id.
131. Sheldon L Banoff, Reducing the Income Tax Burden of ProfessionalPersons by Use of
Corporations, Joint Ventures, Sub-partnerships, and Trusts, 58 TAxES 968, 972 (1980).

According to the dissent in the tax court's opinion, the theory presented by Professor Banoff
"appears to have been adopted" by the IRS in Sargent. Sargent v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 572,
588 n.4 (1989) (dissenting opinion).
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ty and efficiency."12 Professor Banoff suggested that the test for determining which personal service corporations ought to be respected should be
whether, prior to incorporation, the service person is recognized as already
being in an existing trade or business under common law principles or
whether he is merely an employee.'33
Thus, under Professor Banoff's approach, the issue is whether, prior
to incorporation, the individual who performed the service is recognized as
an employee or as an independent contractor operating a separate trade or
business." 4 In making this determination in cases involving professional
athletes, the court considers whether the individual who is a professional
athlete has traditionally been required to sign contracts with sports clubs,
creating an employer-employee relationship. 3 ' In Sargent, the tax court
applied this test when it emphasized that hockey was a "team sport" and
that Sargent was a member of a team."3 6 The tax court appeared to
reason that as long as the case involves the kind of sport that is tradition132. Banoff, supra note 131, at 984, 985. According to Professor Banoff, the advantage of
this approach is to formulate a general "principle which has predictive value for both taxpayers
and the IRS." Under the proposed approach, the courts would have to apply a bright-line rule to
distinguish cases in which the personal service corporation should be disregarded. Id. at 984.
It is important to note, however, that Professor Banoff never suggested that any court
adopt this test. Professor Banoff espoused "legislative change" by Congress to "deal with this
evil." This point was apparently missed by both the tax court and the appeals court in Sargent.
See Burton W. Kanter & Sheldon I. Banoff, Incorporationof Pro Athletes--Is IRS a Bad Sport?,
77 J. TAX'N 254 (1992).
133. Banoff, supra note 131, at 984. For example, the athlete who traditionally has been
required to sign contracts with a sports club (creating an employee relationship) could not
incorporate his personal services as a ball player. On the other hand, athletes who compete
independently (e.g., professional golfers) would not be deemed employees under common law
concepts and could thus incorporate their professional activities. Id. at 985.
Taking this approach a step further, Professor Banoff suggested that a professional athlete
can form a corporation to handle certain aspects of his business that are not related to his work
with the athletic team. For example, an athlete could incorporate his tangential services (i.e.,
endorsements and personal appearance fees) as those constitute one or more separate trades or
businesses and are not susceptible to employee status. Id. at 985.
As another example, consider a professional tennis player who competes both on tour and
who also competes as a team member on the team tennis circuit. Under the proposed rules, the
athlete's personal service corporation would be recognized as the earner of income on the tour,
but it would not be as to team tennis earnings because as a team member her services are more
like those of an employee, Id. at 985.
134. Banoff, supra note 131, at 984.
135. Id.
136. Sargent v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 572, 580 (1989).
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as
ally operated as a team sport, the athletes who traditionally play
37
members of the team should not be permitted to form corporations.
The court of appeals, in contrast, rejected this "team sports"
analysis, 38 reasoning that the "team sports" analysis draws a kind of
bright-line rule that is not justified. 39 The court of appeals, instead,
adopted the "control test" described in Johnson.40 Under the "control
test," the determining factors are the contractual relationships between the
athlete, his corporation, and the athletic team."' The court of appeals
reasoned that the "team sports" test short-cuts this analysis of the contractual relationships and of the facts in each case by focusing instead on a single
element, the "team sports"142nature of the activity involved, which cannot be
controlled by the parties.
III. CONTRASTING THE APPROACHES

In this section, this Note will first summarize the approaches adopted
by the tax court and the court of appeals and compare the two approaches.
Finally, this section will offer criticism of, and argument against, the tax
court's approach.
A. The Tax Court's Approach
The approach espoused by the tax court can be summarized as
follows: First, the court analyzes the relationships among the athlete, his
personal service corporation, and the sports club that employs him'.'
The court analyzes their relationships byl applying the factors described in
the withholding regulations that distinguish an employee from an independent contractor.'" The court applies these factors to determine if the
athlete was in effect an employee of the sports club rather than an
employee of the personal service corporation. 4 ' Second, the court analyzes the relationships of the parties prior to the time at which the
137. I&
138. Sargent v. Commissioner, 929 F.2d 1252, 1256 (8th Cir. 1991).

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1258.

142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 1256.
93 T.C. at 578.
Id. at 578-79.
Id.
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individual athlete formed his or her personal service corporation.'" If
prior to the time of incorporation the athlete was considered a mere
employee of the sports club, then incorporation does not change his or her
status as an employee. 47
One can argue that this approach in effect creates a presumption 48
that an individual athlete who is working as an employee for a sports club
cannot change his status from an employee to an independent contractor by
the mere act of incorporating his talents.'4 9 To rebut this presumption,
the athlete may argue the factors established by the withholding regulations. 50 The most important of these factors is the sports club's right to
control the means by which the athlete's work is preformed.'
Since
almost all sports clubs control the conduct of their athletes to a material
extent, it is hard to see how an athlete playing for a professional sports club
can argue that he or she should be allowed to incorporate. 5 2
B. The Court of Appeals' Approach
To be contrasted with the tax court's view is the "traditional
approach" adopted by the court of appeals. This approach requires the
court to first examine the facts to determine whether the corporation was
formed for a legitimate business purpose and is therefore not a mere
"sham" or factious entity.'53 Once satisfied that the corporation was
formed for a legitimate business purpose, the court then applies the "agency
or alter ego" test to determine whether the personal service corporation is
a mere agent of the individual shareholder."54 If the corporation is not a
factious entity or a mere agent of the individual shareholder, the court then
applies the "actual earner" test, the "control" test, and the "constructive
receipt" test to determine whether income should be reallocated (under the
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
(1943)).
154.

Id. at 579.

Id
Banoff, supra note 131, at 984 ("overall principle").

Id.
Id.
93 T.C. at 578.
Id. at 579-80.
929 F.2d at 1259 (applying Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39
Jones v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1981).
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provisions of section 482) from the personal service corporation to the indi5
vidual-shareholder in order to properly reflect income. 1
C. Comparing the Approaches
The traditional approach (revolving around the "control test") adopted
by the court of appeals has several virtues. Unlike the tax court's
approach, which in effect creates a presumption against the validity of the
personal service corporation, the traditional approach begins with a
56
presumption in favor of the validity of the personal service corporation.'
Under the doctrine of Moline Properties,the personal service corporation,
once formed for a legitimate business reason, is presumed to be a separate
157
entity.
Second, the traditional approach requires a more detailed analysis of
the facts in each case. Specifically, the traditional approach requires the
court to examine and understand the contractual relationships between the8
5
parties involved. The traditional approach is a "contract theory"'
approach. Under the traditional approach, it is the contractual provisions
between the parties that determine: (1) whether the corporation is a mere
"agent" of the individual shareholder; 59 (2) whether the corporation or
the individual is the "actual earner" of income; 6' (3) whether the
corporation or the individual is the one in "control" of incoming funds;' 6'
and (4) whether the funds retained by the corporation are subject to "substantial limitations or restrictions" so that funds retained by the corporation
are not "constructively received" by the individual owner."
By adopting a presumption in favor of personal service corporations
and a "contract theory" mode of analysis, the traditional approach, approved
by the court of appeals in Sargent, provides an adequate framework for
case-by-case analysis of personal service corporations. 63 In contrast, the
tax court's approach, with its presumption against the validity of personal
155. Sargent v. Commissioner, 929 F.2d 1252, 1260 (8th Cir. 1991) (discussion of section 482
of the Internal Revenue Code).
156. Id.
157. IdM
158. Id. at 1258,
159. See Jones v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1981).
160. Johnson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 882, 890 (1982).
161. i
162. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1979).
163. Banoff, supra note 131, at 984.
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service corporations, and with its emphasis on the employer's ability to
control the means in which work is accomplished, provides a harsh
rule that
4
disregards the contractual relationships between the parties.'
D. Attacking the IRS' Approach
In its Action on Decision, the IRS severely criticized the court 6of5
appeals for refusing to follow the approach espoused by the tax court.
The IRS' argument is that, in adopting a "contract theory" of analysis, the
court of appeals had applied a "form-over-substance" analysis. 66 The
67
IRS favors the tax court's approach as the one that focuses on reality.
If the IRS should raise these issues again, as it promised it will, what
argument would most likely convince the court not to follow the tax court's
approach?
Counsel should argue that the issue of the validity of personal service
corporations has been discussed extensively by the Supreme Court and the
federal courts for almost a century."" The established lines of cases start
with a presumption in favor of the validity of the personal service corporation 69 and then focus on the issue of how income should be allocated
between the personal service corporation and its individual-shareholders."70 The established cases require the court to consider the contracts
between the parties involved, based on the theory that contracts between
parties are not mere pieces of paper but reflect the understanding and
reliance interests of the parties.'
The tax court's decision is an unwarranted aberration from the
established rules.'72 First, the tax court's approach, in effect, creates a
presumption against the validity of personal service corporations, 173 and
therefore the tax court's approach conflicts with the doctrine of Moline
Properties, under which a corporation formed for a legitimate business
164. Id.
165. Sargent v. Commissioner, 929 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1991), action on decision, 1991-022
(Oct. 22, 1991).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Banoff, supra note 131, at 984.
169. Sargent v. Commissioner, 929 F.2d 1252, 1259 (8th Cir. 1991).
170. Id. at 1260.
171. Id. at 1258.
172. Sargent v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 572, 587 (1989) (dissenting opinion).
173. Banoff, supra note 131, at 984.
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purpose should be treated as a separate taxable entity. 74 Second, the tax
court's approach, by focusing on an employer-employee view of relationships, permits the court to ignore the contractual relationships between the
parties intended to control their rights and liabilities.'7 5
The tax court's approach instead requires the court to apply arbitrary
factors stated in the withholding regulations, the most important being the
degree to which the alleged employer has the right to control the means in
which the work is performed. 76 When the courts ignore the contracts
and apply these factors, the courts, in effect, deny the taxpayers their right
to "structure their affairs.' 77 At the same time, the courts create uncertainty as to the validity of these contracts.
Finally, counsel should point out that commentators who might agree
with the tax court's view have suggested that any change in law in this area
should be made by the legislature and not the courts. 178 Counsel should
argue that because of its character as a bright-line rule, with wide-ranging
effects, the question should be decided by the legislature and not the
17 9

courts.

IV. CONCLUSION

Even after the 1986 tax reforms, athletes and other professionals can
enjoy substantial tax benefits by operating as personal service corporations."' In Sargent, the tax court adopted a standard for reviewing
personal service corporations that places in doubt the validity of these
corporations.' 8 ' The tax court was reversed in the Eighth Circuit, but the2
IRS promised to raise the Sargent arguments again in all other circuits.'
The approach espoused by the IRS, and adopted by the tax court in
Sargent, puts in doubt the validity of personal service corporations in cases
in which the shareholders are professional athletes who are normally
employed by sports clubs or who participate in team sports.' 83 The IRS
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Mohine Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 405 U.S. 394, 398-99 n.4 (1972).
93 T.C. at 578.
405 U.S. at 394, 398-99 n.4.
Banoff, supra note 131, at 984.
Id

180. See CCH TAx TRANSAcTIONS LIBRARY, THE FRIMED ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY

§ 1002 (1993).
181. Kanter & Banoff, supra note 29, at 254.
182. Id
183. Il
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was reversed once, but until the issue is settled by a higher court, athletes

and others who incorporate their talents may find themselves skating on
thin ice.
George A. Vausher'

184. Id.
* The author would like to thank the staff and editors of the Loyola Entertainment Law
Journal for their hard work, assistance, and comments. The author would also like to thank
Professor Dan Schechter for his valuable suggestions. This article is dedicated to Heidi and Molly
Vausher.
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